Daily Kos :: Manning Memo is the Gunshot Residue

Manning Memo is the Gunshot Residue
by Stirling Newberry at Daily Kos

Wed Jun 15th, 2005 at 08:20:04 CDT

Earlier I looked at the Options Memo, which showed that Bush felt he had all he needed to invade except a PR campaign, and the British would lay out criteria for an invasion - everyone of which they would abandon to get on board with Bush.

This morning it is time to take a look at other Spring 2002 memos to see how well they answer the simple question: "What did the President decide and when did he decide it?"

The Manning Memo isn't the smoking gun, but it does have gunshot residue all over it.

[And you may want to read my dismembering of the ponyhawks on bopnews: March Madness.]


Secret - Strictly Personal

But not FYEO, also cc'd This was, in short, working knowledge in No. 10.

FROM: DAVID MANNING
DATE: 14 MARCH 2002

CC: JONATHAN POWELL

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR TRIP TO THE US

This means that by the time of this memo, the Iraq options memo had been digested. Namely: no intelligence to support invasion, no legal justification for regime change, and the US was pushing .

I had dinner with Condi on Tuesday; and talkes and lunch with her and an NSC team on Wednesday (to which Christopher Meyer also came). These were good exchanges, and particularly frank when we were one-on-one at dinner. I attach the records in case you want to glance.

Note Condi, not Powell. This means that Iraq is in the stage where all planning had been done, and was ready for implementation. This was not a negotiation over what to do, but over when to pull the trigger.

The lady who doesn't respond to "bin Laden determined to Strike in US" clearly had "everything ready for her signature".

IRAQ

Note, not Afghanistan, not Al Qaeda, not even GWOT. Iraq is the top item. They'd moved on.

We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and registered that you are getting flak.

Blair was already on board with whatever policy had been picked.

I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was verty different from anything in the States.

And that policy is Regime change. By the time of this memo the Iraq Options Memo would have discarded all options other than "full scale invasion", the question merely being whether to attempt to seed revolt first or just go in directly.

In short the March trip is when the die was cast. This answers one of Conyer's questions.

Moreover, the implication is that Bush and Blair both agree that the US Congress and Press are a great deal more compliant than in Britain. Think on that for a moment.


And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was not an option.

Note how this insistence went by the boards. The Iraq option memo set a lower bound of 200K troops and a nation-building program. Clearly a Blair decided that a failed state is not failure.


Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed.

That is, our current Secretary of State was part of the squad pushing to end run the UN, and engage in a policy with "no justification under international law". The PM seemed cool with that.


But there were some signs, since we last spoke, of greater awareness of the practical difficulties and political risks. (See attached piece by Seymour Hersh which Christopher Meyer says gives a pretty accurate picture of the uncertain state of the debate in Washington.

In short, the leaders knew that there was a considered body of opinion that Iraq was a Really Bad Idea (tm) and were really only worried about massaging public opinion. Note no reference to a comprehensive military analysis.

From what she said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions:


- How to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified.

This comes out and says it all: invasion was a done deal, and Blair and Bush had a necessary war without evidence of military necessity, and a justified war without legal justification.

- what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition

Described by Iraq options memo as "weak", "divided", "without military capability", "compromised by Iraqi intelligence" and lead by "Western stooges". I filmed a demonstration in May of that year and talked with members of the Iraqi ex-pat community. They seemed like well meaning bureaucrats and somewhat shady businessmen - who would have trouble finding the right end of a gun, or a political negotiation.

If this was still being discussed, then Blair's intelligence failures begin in London.

- how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition (assuming there is any);

As we later saw, the answer to this was "fuck 'em".


- what happens on the morning after

"Will you still respect me in the morning?"

Bush will want to pick your brains. He will also want to hear whether he can expect coalition support. I told COndi that we realized that the Administration could go it alone if it chose. But if it wanted comapny, it would have to take account of teh concerns of its potential coalition partners.

Unilateral invasion withou justification was on the table. A clear violation of the UN Charter, and the US' own cease fire with Iraq.

In short, this is testimony to an impeachable offense.

Moreover it is clear that the only question on anyone's mind of any urgency is running the PR campaign. This would culminate when, by July, intelligence was clear that there were no WMD that could be deployed, and that Saddam had not, in fact, substansively violated UN sanctions, at least, no more than US and its allies had participated in helping him do with smuggling.

- The Un (sic but a really good one) dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled in a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was conscious of the international framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need for a legal base. Renwed (sic) refused by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument;

Note the language, the entire inspections thing was a farce from day one. meant to fool people like Spouting Thomas. Note also from the Iraqi options memo that Plan B was "use inspections to spy". Also a violation of the UN resolution creating the inspections. In short, both options for inspections were in violation of the letter of the law.

- the paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine. Unless we did we could find ourselves bombing Iraq and losing the Gulf.

Note that there is not one word about a connection between Saddam and the Global war on Terrorism, Al Qaeda or Saudi Arabia. This was completely isolated from 911 in any shape manner or form at this level.

Note that the Global War on Terrorism isn't even mentioned. In effect, the view from Downing Street and the Oval Office was that it was over by this point.

YOUR VISIT TO THE RANCH

No doubt we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my talks with Condi convinced me that Bush wants to hear your views on Iraq before taking decisions.

"Poodle want pet before we blast Saddam together?"

The entire attitude here is of a subordinate trying to convince a superior not to completely bollix a plan already in progress. That is Blair is essentially a pro-consul for Britain.


This gives you real influence; on the public relations strategy; on the UN and weapons inspectionsl and on US planning for any military campaign.

But nto to actually stop an ill advised and admittedly illegal war. Nor for any post-war planning. This is all about political cover.


I think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn't an option, but this does not mean that they will avoid it.

Ya think?

Will the Sunni majority really respond to an uprising lead by Kurds and Shias? Will Americans really put enough ground troops to do the job if the Kurdish/Shi'ite stratagem fails? Even if they do will they be willing to take the sort of casualties that the Republican Guard may inflict on them if it turns out to be an urban war, and Iraqi troops don't conveniently collapse in a heap as Richard Perle and others confidently predict? They need to answer these and other tough questions, in a more convincing way than they have so far before concluding that they can do the business.

As noted, the Iraqi options memo shows that uprising was discounted. Only one of the ought questions was answered, the US would bribe enough troops if it started to look ugly. Which worked.

Note how one of the tough questions is "will the US be able to handle the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure?" Note that another non-question was "What would the post-Saddam Iraq look like?" Note that a third non-question was "Can the international community be persuaded to forgive debts incurred under Saddam as part of giving the new Iraq a fighting chance?"


The talks at the ranch will also give you the chance to push Bush on the Middle East. The Iraq factor means that there may never be a better opportunityto (sic) get this Administration to give sustained attention to revising the MEPP.

DAVID MANNING

Again note that GWOT is a non-issue. The entire alerts and the rest, was all Orwellian image of a war with Eurasia.

Bottom line

1. Invasion was all but decided, the question was merely how to grease the pig down the shaft.
2. Bush was going in no matter what.
3. Blair was desperate to be on board.
4. The Global War on Terrorism was a non-issue by this point, and everything you were seeing on Fox was, as far as Bush and Blaire were concerned, merely aiding the way into Iraq.

Daily Kos :: Manning Memo is the Gunshot Residue